Consider nonempty nite pure strategy sets S 1 ; : : : ; S n , let S = S 1 : : : S n , let be a nite space of \outcomes," let ( ) be the set of probability distributions on , and let : S ! ( ) be a function. We study the conjecture that for any utility in a generic set of n{tuples of utilities on there are nitely many distributions on induced by the Nash equilibria of the game given by the induced utilities on S. We give a counterexample refuting the conjecture for n 3. Several special cases of the conjecture follow from well known theorems, and we provide some generalizations of these results.
Introduction
This paper studies a class of conjectures concerning the generic determinacy of the Nash equilibrium concept. Let S 1 ; : : : ; S n be nonempty nite sets of pure strategies, let S = S 1 : : : S n , let be a nite set of \outcomes," and let : S ! ( ) be a function, where ( ) is the set of probability measures on . Utility functions u 1 ; : : : ; u n : ! IR induce payo functions v 1 ; : : : ; v n : S ! IR according to the formula for expected utility: v i (s) = P !2 u i (!) (s)(!). The most general form of the conjecture (refuted by counterexample in x3) is that for a generic set of u 1 ; : : : ; u n the set of distributions on induced by Nash equilibria of the derived game is nite. Our counterexample has three agents; whether the conjecture holds for two person games is an open problem.
In the remainder of this introduction we review known results of this type and explain the motivation for the conjecture. Notation and mathematically attractive variants of the conjecture are presented in x2. In x3 we present a counterexample which refutes the general form of the conjecture, and we describe some interesting open questions. Useful results from semi-algebraic geometry are presented in x4, and in x5 these tools are used to prove the following positive results: (a) the conjecture holds when there are just two outcomes; (b) if, at all mixed strategy tuples, for each agent i the set of distributions on that agent i can induce by changing her strategy is ( # S i ? 1){dimensional, then for generic utilities there are nitely many equilibria; (c) for a generic set of functions : S ! ( ) it is the case that, for generic utilities, there are nitely many equilibria.
Extensive Games of Perfect Information
Consider an extensive form game of perfect information (without chance moves), let Z be the set of terminal nodes, and let : Z ! be a function from terminal nodes to outcomes. Then G P = fu 2 (IR ) I : u i (! 1 ) 6 = u i (! 2 ) for all i 2 I and all ! 1 ; ! 2 2 g is evidently the complement of a nite union of hyperplanes. For each i let S i be the set of pure strategies for agent i, where a pure strategy is a function assigning a successor node to each node at which agent i chooses. Then each s 2 S = S 1 : : : S n determines a unique terminal node (s) 2 Z in the usual way, and we may let = : S ! . We claim that if u 2 G P and is a Nash equilibrium for u, then the probability distribution (induced by ) on is degenerate, in the sense that it assigns probability to { 1 { some element of . To show this we begin by observing that , appropriately interpreted, is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form game obtained, as above, from the extensive form derived by eliminating all nodes and branches that occur with zero probability. In this smaller tree every node occurs with positive probability, so for each node there is a well de ned conditional probability distribution on . If there is any node at which this conditional distribution is nondegenerate (i.e., not a vertex of ( )), then there must be a \lowest" such node, by which we mean that the conditional distributions at all successor nodes are degenerate. But at such a lowest node the agent who chooses cannot be optimizing, since she is not indi erent between any of the pure outcomes resulting from the various successor nodes.
The argument just given is a slight generalization of the one used by Kuhn (1953) to prove his \backwards induction" theorem characterizing what are now called subgame perfect equilibria of games of perfect information.
Two Agents, Two Outcomes
Assume that there are two players and two outcomes, i.e., n = 2, and is, say, fa; bg. Generically, neither agent is indi erent between a and b. If the agents disagree about whether a is better than b then, after rescaling, the game is zero sum, and the minimax theorem implies that all Nash equilibria have the same expected payo s, hence induce the same distribution on . In the case that the agents agree that, say, a is better than b, then a slightly more complicated argument is required. Any Nash equilibrium is a totally mixed equilibrium of the game obtained by eliminating unused strategies, and the equilibrium conditions of totally mixed equilibrium are una ected by reversing an agent's preference of a over b, so the result is obtained from the minimax theorem and the fact that the set of possible truncations of the game is nite. In Theorem 5.1 below we show that generic niteness of the set of outcome distributions holds whenever there are two outcomes, regardless of the number of agents.
For the two player case, the assumption that there are two outcomes implies that, generically, either the game is zero sum (up to positive a ne rescaling of utilities) or a game of common interest, in that the two agents have the same utility function (again, up to rescaling). Govindan and McLennan (1997) present a di erent generalization of this result which requires that there be two players, but allows arbitrarily many outcomes: generically in the space of common interest utilities, and also generically in the space of zero sum payo s, there are nitely many equilibrium outcomes.
Harsanyi's Theorem
When = S and is the identity function, our conjecture reduces to the issue of generic niteness in the space of normal form payo s. Perhaps motivated by the introduction of issues of generic determinacy in economic theory in the work of Debreu (1970) { 2 { on \smooth" general equilibrium theory, Harsanyi (1973) proved that, for a generic set of normal form payo s, it is the case that all equilibria are regular. We do not wish to give a precise description of the notion of regular equilibrium. Instead we simply note that a regular equilibrium is necessarily an isolated pointed in the set of equilibria, and since the set of equilibria is always compact, when all equilibria are regular the set of equilibria is necessarily nite. Thus Harsanyi's theorem implies the case of our conjecture given by normal form payo s. Theorems 5.3 and 5.6 generalize the generic niteness corollary of Harsanyi's result. It seems plausible that suitable generalizations of Harsanyi's notion of regularity can be de ned, and that the framework laid out in x4 and x5 would be useful in discussing these notions.
Extensive Games
Harsanyi's result can be criticized as being of diminished relevance insofar as the normal form is typically thought of as being derived from an extensive form, so that many normal form pure strategy vectors correspond to a single terminal node of the extensive form. The space of extensive form utilities corresponds to a linear subspace of the space of normal form utilities, and generic niteness in the subspace does not follow automatically from generic niteness in the larger space. There are numerous examples of extensive forms with open sets of terminal node utilities, for each of which the set of Nash equilibria is in nite. Kreps and Wilson (1982) proved a theorem that responds to this critique. Consider an extensive form game of incomplete information, let Z be the set of terminal nodes, and let = Z. Kreps and Wilson (1982) show that for a generic set of u 2 (IR Z ) I the set of distributions on Z (\paths") induced by sequential equilibria is nite, but they also mention (p. 881) that this remains true if one considers paths induced by Nash equilibria. (Kuhn's (1953) theorem concerning the equivalence of normal form and behavioral strategies implies that this is correct as a statement about the Nash equilibria of the normal form.) Their result appears to have considerable epistemological signi cance insofar as the distribution on terminal nodes is precisely what is seen by a \social scientist" who repeatedly observes agents playing the game.
A variant of the criticism above can be leveled at Kreps and Wilson's result. Many games arising in economic models, and in other contexts, have sets of terminal nodes that are naturally regarded as a priori equivalent for reasons arising out of the nature of the phenomenon being modelled. Again, the \relevant" space of terminal node utilities is a linear subspace of the space of all terminal node utilities, and generic niteness in the subspace does not follow from Kreps and Wilson's theorem. This point of view is argued by Mailath, Samuelson, and Swinkel (1993, p. 283) . Had the conjecture presented here been true, it would have responded to this criticism. \Cheap talk" formalized by payo -irrelevant message spaces is a particularly im-portant instance of the type of identi cation just mentioned. Park (1997) shows that, in sender-receiver games in which an informed sender chooses a message that is observed by an uninformed receiver, who then chooses an action, for generic payo s on the set of (type-of-sender, action) pairs there are nitely many distributions on the set of such pairs induced by Nash equilibria. It is noteworthy that Park does not x the message space in advance, so that the set of equilibrium distributions on type-action pairs is in e ect the union, over message spaces of all cardinalities, of the set of equilibrium pairs for a given message space.
The Conjectures
The conditions de ning Nash equilibrium can be thought of as a system of equalities (for each agent, all strategies assigned positive probability must have the same expected payo ) and weak inequalities (probabilities are nonnegative, and for each agent the expected payo resulting from any unused strategy is not greater than the expected payo resulting from the strategies that are used). It seems plausible that the weaker equilibrium notion given by the equalities alone will have the same generic properties, and that the analysis might be simpler. As we explain below, generic niteness results for this weak notion imply corresponding results for the more demanding concepts. Thus we are led to consider some unusual constructs.
For any nite set X let the a ne hull of the standard unit vectors in IR X be H(X) = f 2 IR X : x2X (x) = 1g:
Then the set of probability measures on X is (X) = H(X) \ IR X + , and the set of interior probability measures is (X) = H(X) \ IR X ++ . For x 2 X we will often let x also denote the Dirac measure at x, that is, the probability measure on X that assigns all mass to x. We x a game form given by the following information. There are n agents indexed by i = 1; : : : ; n. For each i let S i be a nonempty nite set of pure strategies. Let S = S 1 : : : S n be the set of pure strategy vectors, let be a nite set of outcomes and let the pure outcome function be : S ! ( ), a function assigning an outcome to each vector of pure strategies. We say that the game form is a pure outcome game form if the image of is contained in , where we identify with the set of vertices of ( ). Let = (S 1 ) : : : (S n ); = (S 1 ) : : : (S n ); = H(S 1 ) : : : H(S n ):
Typical elements of are denoted by = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ), = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ); : : : For 2 and i 2 H(S i ), let j i = ( 1 ; : : : ; i?1 ; i ; i+1 ; : : : ; n ):
The probabilistic outcome function derived from is P : ! H( ) given by the formula
Observe that P is multia ne: holding 1 ; : : : ; i?1 ; i+1 : : : ; n xed, P is an a ne function of i ; i = 1; : : : ; n. Conversely, straightforward algebra (see 5.4) shows that if P : ! H( ) is multia ne, then it coincides with the probabilistic outcome function derived, via the formula above, from the pure outcome function obtained by restricting P to n{tuples of pure strategies. Let U i = (IR ) (the dual of IR ) be the space of utilities for agent i; i = 1; : : : ; n, and let the space of utility vectors be U = U 1 : : : U n with typical element u = (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ). Our analysis involves three notions of (mathematical, not necessarily conceptual) equilibrium:
De nition 2.1: 2 is a Nash equilibrium for u 2 U if i (s i ) u i (P( j s i ) ? P( j t i )) 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n and s i ; t i 2 S i : Let E N = f( ; u) 2 U : is a Nash equilibrium for ug. Let G N be the set of u 2 U such that fP( ) : is a Nash equilibrium for ug is nite. De nition 2.2: 2 is a totally mixed equilibrium for u 2 U if u i (P( j s i ) ? P( j t i )) = 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n and s i ; t i 2 S i : Let E T = f( ; u) 2 U : is a totally mixed equilibrium for ug. Let G T be the set of u 2 U such that fP( ) : is a totally mixed equilibrium for ug is nite. De nition 2.3: 2 is a quasiequilibrium for u 2 U if u i (P( j s i ) ? P( j t i )) = 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n and s i ; t i 2 S i :
Let E Q = f( ; u) 2 U : is a quasiequilibrium for ug. Let G Q be the set of u 2 U such that fP( ) : is a quasiequilibrium for ug is nite.
Our formulation of the equilibrium condition is somewhat unusual, but it is evident that our de nition of Nash equilibrium is standard: expected utility maximization is equivalent to assigning zero probability to any pure strategy whose expected utility is less than that of some other pure strategy. The importance of totally mixed equilibrium arises out of the observation that a Nash equilibrium for a utility u is (in the obvious sense) a totally mixed equilibrium of the game consisting of u and the game form obtained by eliminating all unused pure strategies. It worth mentioning here that the Kreps-Wilson { 5 { result for extensive form games (loc. cit) is obtained by restricting attention to totally mixed (behavioral) strategies. The notion of quasiequilibrium is obtained by dropping the requirement that probabilities be positive from the de nition of totally mixed equilibrium.
De nition 2.4: For any m 0 we say that G IR m is a generic set, or generic, if IR m ? (int G) has Lesbesgue measure 0.
The following conjectures are the main concern of this paper.
Conjecture N: G N is a generic set. Conjecture T: G T is a generic set. Conjecture Q: G Q is a generic set.
Of course Conjecture N is the proposition of greatest conceptual interest. Obviously it implies Conjecture T. On the other hand, for any game form there are nitely many game forms obtained by deleting pure strategies, and nite intersections of generic sets are generic, so if Conjecture T held for all game forms, Conjecture N would follow.
Clearly Conjecture Q would imply Conjecture T, and thus Conjecture N. Conversely, if Conjecture Q is false, then so is Conjecture T (1) . Conjecture Q is mathematically simpler than Conjecture T, so it appears to be the most inviting framework for analysis.
It is conceivable that there is a continuum of equilibrium distributions over , but that all of them give all agents the same expected utility. Consequently, associated with each of these conjectures is the seemingly weaker conjecture that for generic utilities there are nitely many vectors of expected utilities generated by equilibria of the given type. However, unless the number of players is xed, a counterexample to the strong conjecture can be converted to a counterexample for the weak conjecture by adding a player with only one move who (generically) cares about the variation in outcome allowed by equilibrium. For the case of two agent games the weak conjecture is established by Mas-Colell (1994) , the strong form of the conjecture for two agents is an open problem. From this point of view it is important to note that the three agent counterexample in x3 has a continuum of induced utility vectors.
(1) The following sketch uses concepts and results developed in Section 4, and is intended for a reader who returns to this point after absorbing the material there. Applying 4.5, E Q is a semi-algebraic set, and 4.6 implies that G Q is also semi-algebraic. By 4.3, G Q is generic if and only if its complement has no interior, so suppose that W U is an open set of utilities u for which O(u) = fP( ) : is a quasiequilibrium for ug is in nite. That O(u) is semi-algebraic follows from 4.5, so 4.2 implies that it is uncountable for u 2 W .
Assume that is covered by the interiors of P 1 ; P 2 ; : : : where each P k = P k 1 : : : P k n is a product of full-dimensional simplices P k i H(S i ). For each u 2 W there must be some k such that fP( ) : 2 P k and is a quasiequilibrium for ug is uncountable, and using 4.6, we can arrange for this to be the case for all u in an open W 0 W . For each i = 1; : : : ; n let i : H(S i ) ! H(S i ) be an a ne map with i ( (S i )) = P k i . Then replacing P by P ( 1 : : : n ) gives an example for which G T is not a generic set.
{ 6 { 3. The Counterexample
We now refute Conjecture T (hence also Conjectures N and Q) by means of a counterexample. Consider the following game form in which agent 1 is the row player, agent 2 is the column player, and agent 3 is the matrix player:
In our discussion we will attach subscripts to the outcomes to indicate payo s, so that a 1 is the payo to agent 1 when outcome a occurs, etc. Let p, q, r, and s be the probabilities of N, E, S, and W, respectively; of course p + q + r + s = 1. Let y and z be the probabilities of L and U respectively.
We now derive necessary conditions for a totally mixed equilibrium. To begin with note that agent 1's indi erence between N and E implies that 
It is a very important point that the lottery over outcomes resulting from S is a convex combination of the lotteries resulting from N and E, so that whenever agent 1 is indi erent between N and E, she is also indi erent between either of these strategies and S. (4) We can now easily produce the desired counterexample. So long as the parameters avoid problems of division by zero in (1) and (2), agent 1's indi erence conditions determine y and z. Once these numbers are xed, there are two linear conditions (in addition to p + q + r + s = 1) on agent 1's strategy, with parameters given by the utilities of agents 2 and 3. Except on an obvious set, with positive codimension, of special utilities for these two agents, there will be a one dimensional space of (p; q; r; s) satisfying all conditions. There is no great art to choosing particular values of the parameters such that y; z 2 (0; 1) and this line passes through the interior of the simplex f (p; q; r; s) 2 IR 4 + : p+q+r+s = 1 g, and we leave this aspect of the argument to the reader. The set of solutions varies continuously, in the obvious sense, on the open set of parameters that do not give rise to some division by zero in the equations above, so we have the desired open set of utilities for which there are a continuum of totally mixed equilibria.
When agent 1 plays W, the outcomes are di erent from those resulting from any other pure strategy agent 1 might choose, so the one dimensional continuum of totally mixed equilibria maps to a one dimensional set of distributions over outcomes so long as s varies in the set of equilibria, which is typically the case. Equations (1){(4) make no reference to e 3 and f 3 , so the expected utility of agent 3 varies so long as these payo s are not exceptional.
Semi-algebraic Geometry
We now state some important concepts and results of semi-algebraic geometry, to some extent indicating their consequences for the problems at hand. Proofs of major results are omitted: the authoritative reference for this material is Bochnak, Coste, and Roy (1987) ; expositions similar to the one below, but somewhat more extensive, occur in Blume and Zame (1994) and Schanuel, Simon, and Zame (1991) .
A real algebraic variety is a set of the form fx 2 IR m : P(x) = 0g, where P is a polynomial in x 1 ; : : : ; x m with real coe cients. Observe that any condition of the form P 1 (x) = 0 or : : : or P k (x) = 0] is equivalent to P 1 (x) : : : P k (x) = 0, while any condition of the form P 1 (x) = 0 and : : : and P k (x) = 0] is equivalent to P 1 (x) 2 +: : :+P k (x) 2 = 0, so the class of real algebraic varieties is closed under nite union and intersection. (In fact the Hilbert basis theorem implies that an arbitrary intersection of real algebraic varieties is a real algebraic variety -cf. Fulton (1969, xI.4) .) Whitney (1957 Proof: That cartesian products of semi-algebraic manifolds are semi-algebraic manifolds, and that the assertion holds for semi-algebraic manifolds, are more or less immediate consequences of our de nitions above. This is a consequence of one of the most important foundational results of semialgebraic geometry, the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem, which asserts that every rst order formula in the theory of real closed elds, e.g. \there exists y such that x = y 2 ," is equivalent to a rst order formula without quanti ers, e.g. \x 0." This result has been exploited by Blume and Zame (1994) and Schanuel, Simon, and Zame (1991) to obtain results concerning, the relationship between perfect and sequential equilibrium, and, respectively, the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) .
We now present another deep and fundamental theorem of semi-algebraic geometry. Whereas 4.1 decomposes semi-algebraic sets into simple pieces, the following provides a decomposition of maps. Proposition 4.6: (Generic Local Triviality { Hardt (1980) , Bochnak, Coste, and Roy (1987, 9.3 .2)) Let A and B be semi-algebraic sets, and let g : A ! B be a continuous semi-algebraic function. Then there is a relatively closed semi-algebraic set B 0 B with dimB 0 < dimB such that each component C of B ? B 0 has the following property: there is a semi-algebraic set F (the \ ber") and a semi-algebraic homeomorphism h : C F ! g ?1 (C) with g(h(b; f)) = b for all b 2 C and f 2 F.
Our arguments in x5 will apply the following property of semi-algebraic maps. \Space lling curves" show that continuous functions do not have this property.
Lemma 4.7: (Bochnak, Coste, and Roy (1987, 2.8.8) ) If A is a semi-algebraic set and f : A ! IR m is a semi-algebraic function, then dimf(A) dimA. This is almost, but not quite, a consequence of 4.6, since f is not required to be continuous.
The following two consequences of 4.6 are applied in x5. Proposition 4.8: If A and B be semi-algebraic sets and g : A ! B is a continuous semi-algebraic surjection, then dim B + min b2B dimg ?1 (b) dimA dimB + max b2B dim g ?1 (b):
Proof: If C; F, and h are as in 4.6, then dimg ?1 (C) = dim C + dimF by 4.4 and 4.7, and 4.5 also implies that dimg ?1 (b) = dimh ?1 (g ?1 (b)) = dim(fbg F) = dimF for b 2 C, so { 10 { that dim g ?1 (C) = dimC + dimg ?1 (b) for b 2 C. Choosing C such that dimC = dimB, the rst asserted inequality follows since dimg ?1 (C) dimA. Note that 4.6 can also be applied to gjB 0 , where B 0 is as in 4.6. Therefore we can also nd C; F, and h as in 4.6 with dim g ?1 (C) = dimA, from which we obtain the second inequality: 
Positive Results
Our notation is as in x2. We begin by considering the case where there are two (pure) outcomes. This situation might be thought of as pertaining to contests between two teams in which winning and losing are the only outcomes, but note that we contemplate equilibria for teams without a \coach" in that the notion of equilibrium allows a team's behavior to be collectively suboptimal even though each team member is acting in the best interest of the team, given the strategies of all other agents.
Theorem 5.1: If there are two outcomes, then, for a generic set of utilities, the set of quasiequilibrium outcomes is nite.
Proof: The conditions for a quasiequilibrium are una ected if an agent's utility function is replaced by its negation, so there is no loss of (generic) generality in assuming that the game is one of common interest, i.e., that all agents have the same utility function.
{ 11 { Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (1994, pp. 59{60) show that every such game has nitely many quasiequilibrium payo s. Since, generically, each utility level corresponds to a unique outcome, this implies niteness of quasiequilibrium outcomes.
Our next result provides a su cient condition for generic niteness of Nash equilibrium outcomes. In general terms, at any strategy vector the set of outcome utilities for an agent that are consistent with equilibrium is the set of utilities that are constant on the set of outcome distributions that the agent can bring about by varying her strategy. The larger the dimension of this a ne space of outcome distributions, the smaller the dimension of the set of equilibrating utilities. If, at every strategy vector, each agent has a space of achievable outcome distributions that has the same dimension as the agent's space of mixed strategies, the graph of the equilibrium correspondence will have the same dimension as the space of utilities, and Sard's theorem can be applied to the projection from the graph of the equilibrium correspondence to utilities.
More formally, for i = 1; : : : ; n and 2 let
be the dimension of the set of elements of H( ) that agent i can achieve by varying her strategy.
De nition 5.2: We say that is a maximal dimension point if d i ( ) = # S i ? 1 for all i = 1; : : : ; n. We say that is a maximal dimension equilibrium for u if is a maximal dimension point and a quasiequilibrium for u.
Recall our formulation of the environment of Harsanyi's theorem: : S ! is a bijection. This is easily seen to be a su cient condition for every to be a maximal dimension point, but is very far from necessary. Perhaps the simplest nontrivial example is: I = f1; 2g; S 1 = fs 1 ; t 1 g; S 2 = fs 2 ; t 2 g; = fa; b; cg, and given by the matrix:
In order for every strategy vector to be a maximal dimension point, the game form cannot identify two pure strategy vectors with the same outcome if they specify di erent pure strategies for only one agent. This condition is not su cient, as can be seen by identifying b and c in this example, in which case strategy vectors at which either agent is mixing equally between her two strategies are not maximal dimension points. In spite of this it seems clear, albeit di cult to formulate in any precise sense, that when the numbers of agents and strategies are large, \a few" identi cations of pure strategy vectors with { 12 { the same outcome will typically not lead to the existence of strategy vectors that are not maximal dimension points. In this sense the following generalization of Harsanyi's theorem is very substantial. But note that it is not applicable to game forms derived from extensive forms, except in very special cases.
Theorem 5.3: The dimension of B = f ( ; u) : is a maximal dimension equilibrium for u g is not greater than the dimension of U. If every 2 is a maximal dimension point, then dim(f( ; u) : is an quasiequilibrium for ug) dimU, so that f : is an quasiequilibrium for ug and fP( ) : is an quasiequilibrium for ug are nite for a generic set of u. In particular, Conjecture Q holds.
Proof: Let C be the set of maximal dimension points in , and let : B ! C be the natural projection. If 2 C, then for each i the set of u i such that the conditions of quasiequilibrium for agent i, that is fu i 2 U i :
so the claim follows from 4:8. Applying 4.9 to the projection of f( ; u) : is an quasiequilibrium for ug onto U shows that f : is an quasiequilibrium for ug is 0{dimensional, hence nite by 4.2, for all u outside some set of positive codimension. Now apply 4.3:
Our last result is that, for generic choice of : S ! ( ), it is the case, for generic u, that there are nitely many quasiequilibria for u given . The straightforward conceptual interpretation of this result is that it applies to situations in which all strategy vectors lead to lotteries over a small set of outcomes, and the process selecting these lotteries is random with a distribution that is absolutely continuous with respect to Lesbesgue measure. Alternatively, the lotteries may be random in the slightly di erent sense familiar from general equlibrium theory: the modeller has no reason to believe either that any particular vector of lotteries is impossible, or that any set of positive codimension in the space of such vectors has positive probability. It is admittedly di cult to think of concrete applications that t either of these descriptions.
In large part the interest of Theorem 5.6 is mathematical. It asserts that for any S 1 ; : : : ; S n and the set of : S ! ( ) that violate Conjecture Q has positive codimension. Also, it is a generalization of Harsanyi's theorem: when # # S the vectors (s) are linearly independent for generic . Finally, the analysis leading to the proof develops { 13 { a very detailed taxonomy of the relevant possibilities, with implications (such as Corollary 5.7) that go beyond the simple assertion of Theorem 5.6.
We now develop the elementary algebra of multia ne functions, mainly in order to introduce some useful notation. informal, but with a little thought the reader should be able to see that 4.8 could be used to develop a fully rigorous version.) The rst assertion is now derived from 4.8 applied to the projection of A( ) onto . For each ( ; ) 2 A( ) we obviously have dimfu 2 U : is a quasiequilibrium for u given g = i ( # ? i ), and the second assertion is now obtained from the rst by applying 4.8 to the projection of B( ) onto A( ), observing that dimU = n # while dim = P i ( # S i ? 1), and rearranging algebraicly:
Theorem 5.6: For a generic set of H( ) S it is the case for a generic set of u 2 U that f 2 : is a quasiequilibrium for u given g is nite.
Proof: Insofar as there are nitely many vectors of integers with 0 i minf # S i ? 1; # ? 1g, i = 1; : : : ; n, it su ces to show that, given any such , for a generic set of 2 H( ) S it is the case for a generic set of u 2 U that f 2 : ( ; ; u) 2 B( )g is nite. If i = # ? 1 for some i and ( ; ; u) 2 B( ), then agent i must be indi erent between all elements of . The set of such utilities u i 2 U i is one dimensional, so its complement
